

LEVERHULME NATIONAL TOUR

Leverhulme Visiting Professor David M. Pritchard – The University of Edinburgh

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

David M. Pritchard is currently the Leverhulme Visiting Professor at the University of Edinburgh. His permanent position is at the University of Queensland (Australia), where he has chaired the Department of Classics and Ancient History. He has obtained 16 research fellowships in Australia, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Leverhulme Visiting Professor Pritchard is currently the lead chief investigator on a large project that is funded by the Australian Research Council. He is the author of *Athenian Democracy at War* (Cambridge University Press 2019), *Sport, Democracy and War in Classical Athens* (Cambridge University Press 2013) and *Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens* (University of Texas Press 2015). Leverhulme Visiting Professor Pritchard has edited *The Athenian Funeral Oration: After Nicole Loraux* (Cambridge University Press 2024) and *War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens* (Cambridge University Press 2010). He has co-edited *Waging War in Fourth-Century Athens: New Appraisals* (Routledge 2026) and *Sport and Festival in the Ancient Greek World* (Classical Press of Wales 2003). Leverhulme Visiting Professor Pritchard has also published 73 journal articles and book chapters. He has an *h*-index of 22 and 1800 known citations. He has obtained the equivalent of 2.2 million Australian dollars in research funding. Leverhulme Visiting Professor Pritchard speaks on radio and regularly writes for newspapers around the world. His 64 op.-eds have appeared in, among other outlets, *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Germany), *Le Monde* (France), *Le Figaro* (France), *Ouest-France*, *Sud Ouest* (France), *The Conversation* (Australia, France and Spain), *Kathimerini* (Greece), *Inside Story* (Greece), *Scroll.in* (India), *The Age* (Australia), *The Australian*, *Politike* (Brazil) and *The Daily Star* (Bangladesh). Leverhulme Visiting Professor Pritchard obtained his PhD in Ancient History from Macquarie University (Australia).

THE LECTURES AND SEMINARS ON OFFER

Talk numbers 1-6 can be delivered as public lectures or research seminars.

Talk numbers 7-10 can be delivered as public lectures or undergraduate lectures of 1 hour.

Talk numbers 7-8 and 10 can also be given as undergraduate lectures of 2 hours.

1. Children of Athena: The Armed Forces of Democratic Athens

On the eve of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles famously advised the Athenians how they could win. This political leader reassured assemblygoers that they already had the required funds and armed forces for victory. The first corps that Pericles mentioned was the 13,000 hoplites. The next 2 were the 1200-strong cavalry and the 1600 archers. The last military branch of which he spoke was the navy of 300 triremes. This paper's primary aim is to go behind Pericles's famous numbers. For each corps that he mentioned, it studies the legal status of corps-members and their social background. This paper explores how they were recruited into their corps and subsequently mobilised for campaigns. It establishes each corps's history and specific organisation. By treating these four military branches together for the first time, the paper reveals the common practices that the *dēmos* ('people') used to manage their armed forces. It concludes by detailing the common assumptions that they brought to this management.

2. The Funeral Oration after Loraux

In classical Athens, a funeral speech was delivered for dead combatants almost every year, the most famous being that by Pericles in 430 BC. In 1981, Nicole Loraux – the great French ancient historian – transformed our understanding of this genre. Her *The Invention of Athens* showed how the funeral oration reminded the Athenians who they were as a people. Loraux demonstrated how each speech helped them to maintain the same self-identity for two centuries. But *The Invention of Athens* was far from complete. I have directed a large project in France to complete systematically *The Invention of*

Athens. Cambridge University Press has recently published the 19 chapters coming from our project. *The Athenian Funeral Oration: After Nicole Loraux* answers the important questions about the numerous surviving funeral speeches that Loraux ignored. It also undertakes a comparison of the funeral oration with other genres that is missing in her famous book. What emerges is a speech that had a much greater political impact than Loraux ever thought. This paper explores how our new volume puts the study of war in Athenian culture on a completely new footing.

3. The Cadetship of Classical Athens

The classical Athenians voted for a fulltime preparation-program for new hoplites in 335/4 BC. There have for a long time been three debates about this cadetship. The first debate is whether all eighteen-year-olds or only those who had chosen to be hoplites were ephebes. The second debate concerns dating. On one side are those ancient historians who think that the *ephēbeia* ('cadetship') dates back to the early fourth or even the fifth century. But the other side insists that the cadetship was entirely brand new in the mid-330s. The third debate is about why the *dēmos* ('people') actually voted for this military reform. The predominant view is that their vote was a response to the crushing defeat of Athenian hoplites at Chaeronea. But there have always been doubts about whether this was the main reason. J. L. Friend and T. R. Henderson have recently published book-length studies of the Athenian cadetship. Theirs are the first monographs on the *ephēbeia* in sixty years. By championing minority views and making innovative arguments, Friend and Henderson have injected considerable new heat into these old debates. This paper reconsiders the three debates in light of their important books. It aims to settle each debate one way or another by weighing up all-available evidence.

4. The Standing of Sailors in Democratic Athens

Ancient historians regularly argue that the Athenian *dēmos* ('people') held sailors in much lower esteem than hoplites. They cite in support of this argument the extant funeral speech of Pericles. Certainly, this famous speech said a lot about courageous soldiers but next to nothing about sailors. Yet, it is also clear that this was not a typical example of the genre. Funeral speeches usually gave a fulsome account of Athenian military history. In 430 BC, Pericles decided to skip such an account because of the difficult politics that he faced. In rehearsing military history, funeral speeches almost always mentioned naval battles and recognised sailors as courageous. Old comedy and the other genres of public oratory depicted sailors in the same positive terms. All these non-elite genres assumed that a citizen equally fulfilled his martial duty by serving as either a sailor or a hoplite. They used a new definition of courage that both groups of combatants could easily meet. In tragedy, by contrast, characters and choruses used the hoplite extensively as a norm. In epic poetry heroes spoke in the same hoplitic idiom. By copying this idiom, the tragic poets were setting their plays more convincingly in the distant heroic age. In spite of this, tragedy still recognised Athens as a major seapower and could depict sailors as courageous. In Athenian democracy, speakers and playwrights had to articulate the viewpoint of non-elite citizens. Their works put beyond doubt that the *dēmos* esteemed sailors as highly as hoplites.

5. The Archers of Classical Athens

The armed forces that Athens took into the Peloponnesian War had four distinct corps. The two that have been studied the most are the cavalry corps and the navy. The same level of focus is now paid to the hoplite corps. In contrast to these three branches, the archers continue to be largely unstudied. Indeed, the last dedicated study of this corps was published in 1913. This neglect of the archers by military historians is unjustified. The creation of the archer corps in the late 480s was actually a significant military innovation. For the rest of the century, Athens constantly deployed archers in a wide range of important combat-roles. Nevertheless, this neglect explains why four problems about them remain unresolved. The first problem is why the Athenians took the unprecedented step of creating such a corps. Very few military historians recognise this as the problem that it is. The second problem is that many military archers were actually Athenian citizens. It is likely that poverty had ruled out their service as hoplites. But this leaves unexplained why they did not chose the navy,

because naval service was cheaper still and earned much more social esteem. The third problem is the role that the ten tribes played in the archer corps's organisation. Certainly, horsemen and hoplites fought in tribal units. But there is ongoing debate about whether the rest of the armed forces was organised by tribes. The fourth problem is this branch's disappearance after only 80 years. André Plassart attempted to explain it more than a hundred years ago. Since his study, epigraphy has hugely increased what we know about this branch. This new epigraphical evidence shows that Plassart's explanation is no longer valid. This paper's main goal is to resolve these four problems. In doing so, it seeks to redress the archer corps's neglect in ancient military history.

6. Public Spending in Democratic Athens: 200 Years after August Böckh

This paper calculates the public spending of classical Athens. The major public activities of the Athenian *dēmos* ('people') were the staging of religious festivals, the conducting of politics and the waging of wars. There is heated debate about what was spent on these three activities. Ancient historians cannot agree whether the *dēmos* spent more on festivals or wars. These debates go back to the first book on Athenian public finance. August Böckh famously criticised the Athenians for wasting money on their festivals instead of building up their armed forces. Calculating what they spent on their public activities would settle both debates. Böckh lacked the evidence to do such. Two centuries after his *The Public Economy of Athens* is no longer the case. But, in calculating public spending, this paper does more than settle longstanding debates. In classical Athens, the *dēmos* had full control over public spending. In the assembly, they authorised the one-off activities of their *polis* ('city-state') and any changes to its recurring activities. This made it possible for the Athenians to change their pattern of spending and so what they spent on one class of activities relative to others. Such votes allowed the *dēmos* to spend more on what they saw as a priority and less on what was less of a priority. Over time, the sums that they spent on different activities reflected the order of the priorities that they had set for their *polis*. By calculating these sums, this paper confirms whether religious festivals, democratic politics or military campaigns were the Athenian people's overriding public priority.

7. Competing for Olive Oil at the Games of a Warrior Goddess: Sport in Democratic Athens

The Olympics were not actually the biggest Games in ancient Greece. This honour went to the games that the ancient Athenians staged for Athena, who was their cherished warrior goddess. But the Great Panathenaea – the name of these local games – had three mysterious features: winners got many thousands of litres of olive oil as prizes, there were unique sporting events that not even the Olympics had, and many other events were extremely warlike or involved the actual armed forces. This richly illustrated public lecture solves these three mysteries by exploring the decidedly colourful myths about this famous warrior goddess. Leverhulme Visiting Professor David M. Pritchard also gives a sweeping overview of the rich sporting world of ancient democratic Athens.

8. The Social Structure of Democratic Athens

Athenian democracy gave poor citizens the power to change state policies and public discourse. The *dēmos* ('people') used this power to redefine the society of their archaic forebears. Perhaps their most striking redefinition concerned elite-membership. The wealthy had always felt obliged to do a great deal for the community. Now, however, the *dēmos* legally required this social class to perform public services, to pay onerous taxes and to serve in the cavalry. This cultural power of the *dēmos* resulted as well in new norms for assessing their own behaviour. Poor Athenians supported public speakers and playwrights who spoke highly of their military service and political participation. They did the same for those who acknowledged their moderation and strong work ethic. But there were also real limits on what the *dēmos* could redefine. It is very striking that the poor continued to be deeply ashamed of their poverty. This uneven redefinition of the old social structure had clear consequences for state policies. The *dēmos* gained most of their social esteem from soldiering and politics. Consequently, they voted for wars as often as they could. They supported the policy of state pay that gave them the free time to fight for the state and to run the government. Since citizenship gave poor

Athenians so much, they understandably guarded it closely: they generally tightened citizenship-requirements, rarely naturalised foreigners and went so far as to enslave those resident aliens who had had the temerity to pretend to be fellow Athenians.

9. What is the Value of Olympic Victory?

There is hot debate about the value of Olympic victory. Britain now spends hundreds of millions of pounds on getting its national team to the Olympics. Each gold medal that a British sportsman or sportswoman wins literally costs tens of millions of pounds. Sports fans are convinced that this is money well spent. For them, the value of Olympic gold is completely obvious and totally priceless. But those who are less sports mad often claim that such Olympic success is much less valuable. For this side, it is quite clearly a big waste of money – money that would be better spent on teachers and nurses. It is hard to work out which side of this hot debate is right or wrong. One way to do so is to look back at the long history of the Olympic Games. The ancient Greeks competed in Olympics for more than a thousand years. Ancient Greek states actually valued Olympic victory more highly than we do today, giving Olympic victors much more than our keys to the city. In this richly illustrated public lecture, David M. Pritchard – the Leverhulme Visiting Professor – explains what value the ancient Greeks got out of Olympic victory. In doing so, his lecture helps us to work out which side wins in our current hot debate about the modern Olympic Games.

10. The Position of Attic Women in Democratic Athens

For the classical Athenians, the right place for Attic women was at home. They encouraged their wives to focus on making meals and clothes and on running the *oikos* ('household'). They expected them to produce sons so that their households could live on. The Athenians genuinely valued their wives as homemakers and mothers. But they also constantly worried that they lacked self-control. They were obsessed by the possibility that Attic women might have sex outside marriage. The result was that husbands tried to keep their wives away from unrelated men, building houses that lacked windows for passers-by to look in and wives to look out. At the same time, they believed that their wives were better placed than they were to worship the goddesses who controlled the fertility of crops and households. They also relied on them to perform the customary rites for dead relatives. Often too poor wives had to help to keep family businesses or farms going. Every Athenian thus allowed his wife to participate in female-only festivals and funerals and – if his poverty made it necessary – to work outside his *oikos*. Yet, in doing so, a husband insisted that she keep away from men who were not part of the family. Therefore, as she walked through streets she had to avoid talking with such men and to keep her face well hidden behind her veil.

